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Introduction

Citizenship, as a legal and normative concept, defines the condition of full membership in a
sovereign, self-governing national community. Understood in these terms, citizenship produces
remainders: individuals, groups, and ways of life that do not fit in the legal-normative model of
equal citizenship in a single, unified national community. Many of these remainders are
produced by the ancient and venerable practice of human migration, a social practice often found
at or near the center of human societies and cultures for many thousands of years. States have
claimed a right to exercise control of border-crossing activities as central to their understanding
of their sovereign power, and the logic of the status of citizenship only bolsters that claim. If the
state is to treat her citizens as full, equal rights-holding members of society, it must keep track of
who those citizens are; migration must be tracked, and noncitizens permitted to be present in the
polity’s territory must be marked with a status of their own, in part to distinguish them from
citizens.
For tourists, business travelers, and many other border crossers, this arrangement, at least
when functioning reasonably well, raises few concerns. Many countries provide a status for such
visitors consistent with some of the rights of citizenship—protection from crime, due process,
access to infrastructure, and so on—that are necessary for their purposes, but not those elements
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of citizenship that seem irrelevant or inappropriate for them (such as the right to vote or access to
social welfare programs). But for a large group of border crossers, the norms of citizenship
present a greater challenge. The secondary statuses available to them and their access to borders
do not obviously fulfill the requirements of justice. While they are not the only group of people
for whom citizenship as membership produces legal and normative remainders, I will focus here
on a group I call “border-crossing peoples.” I define border-crossing peoples as a distinct group
whose historical cultural, religious, and socioeconomic way of life requires regular and routine
access to the crossing of an international border. Border-crossing peoples generally have a longstanding history of participating in the cultural/social/economic pattern that necessitates that
border crossing; sometimes predating the existence of the border itself, or predating any
significant efforts to control or restrict the border. Just as the control of borders is presumably a
tool a national community uses to maintain and shape its identity, the crossing of the border is
crucial to the shaped identities of border-crossing peoples. In the now-vast literature on migrants
and migration, in which migrants are divided into a variety of analytic categories, this general
category has not (to my knowledge) been identified. The most similar analytic category I’m
aware of is “border-straddling nations,” a category identified recently by Margaret Moore
(2013). My conception of “border-crossing peoples” differs from Moore’s “border-straddling
nations” in two significant ways. First, I do not restrict this category to groups that constitute a
distinct nation, with all that that entails. Some border-crossing peoples may be a small slice of a
nation; others may be identified as a distinct group by a set of markers—perhaps ethnic, regional,
or religious—that fall short of approaching the status of “nationhood.” Second, a border-crossing
people need not “straddle” the border territorially. One quintessential example of a bordercrossing people, whose border-crossing rights are discussed in detail below, is the Kickapoo
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tribe. Their primary territorial locations do not straddle the US/Mexico border—their
reservations in Oklahoma and Kansas and their settlement in Nacimiento, Mexico, are all several
hours’ travel from the US/Mexico border, and yet they are properly characterized as a bordercrossing people because of the historical nature of the social, cultural, familial, and economic ties
between the Kickapoo settlements in Mexico and the United States. Whatever the reason bordercrossing peoples has been ignored in the literature on immigration, it is unfortunate, as they have
a distinct claim for accommodation. Indeed, much of the literature on citizenship and migration
focuses on one-way, permanent migration, not on the kind of back-and-forth border crossing that
characterize the lives of border-crossing peoples (Hampshire 2013). At the same time, the vast
majority of the literature on migration focuses on the on question of the scope and limits of
justifiable migration policies for abstract “liberal-democratic states” or “national communities”
with little attention to the particular histories, practices, sins, or commitments of actually existing
states.1 This chapter attempts to overcome these two shortcomings in the existing literature by
developing and exploring an analytical resource, in the form of a normative-legal concept, to
articulate, justify, and defend claims of border-crossing rights for border-crossing peoples.
My aim here is to go beyond standard approaches to thinking about the boundaries of
citizenship in order to solve the problem of one of citizenship’s remainders. In a sense, I see the
argument presented here as a way of supplementing citizenship in theory and practice, by
stepping outside of standard citizenship thinking and drawing from resources in property and
international law to provide a theory of the rights of border-crossing peoples. One approach to
the remainders of citizenship is the “semi-citizenship” approach advocated by Elizabeth Cohen
(2009), or what Rogers Smith (2015) in this volume calls “appropriately differentiated
1

Exceptions to this trend include Smith (2008), Exdell (2009), and Blake (2013).
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citizenship.” This approach seeks to recognize the universality and apparent unavoidability of the
practice of granting semicitizenship status to some citizens, and investigates the plausibility of
different approaches to partial citizenship statuses (Cohen 2009). The argument fits within this
approach, as I seek to establish why some members of particular groups might have a justified
demand for a specific set of (partial) citizenship rights in a country other than their primary
citizenship home. This may be a demand for full dual citizenship, or may be limited to a demand
for a much less comprehensive partial citizenship narrowly construed as a right of passage to the
second state.
The first section of this chapter considers what it might mean to deny a would-be bordercrosser passage in the most general and abstract terms: is such a refusal best understood as an act
of coercion or an act of prevention? Even if we assume it is (merely) an act of prevention, it still
requires justification, and the way in which we define the right to exclude will shape the contours
and boundaries of that right. The second section of this chapter considers the national territorial
rights thesis as a foundation for the justified right to exclude. This approach relies, crucially, on
an analogy with an individual’s right to exclude others from her private property. In the third
section, I argue David Miller has ignored an important dimension of this analogy. If (individual)
private property rights are appropriately analogized to the act of migrant exclusion by national
communities, we must consider other dimensions of property law that might press in the other
policy direction, identifying cases where migrant inclusion is demanded. The law of easements
suggests one such way. In particular, I will consider the ways in which easements by prescription
and easements by necessity can come to be created in individual property arrangements. In the
fourth section I’ll discuss actually existing arrangements for border-crossing rules that suggest
that something akin to border-crossing easements do exist, incompletely, in existing law and
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custom. In the fifth section, I will use two cases of historically grounded patterns and cultures of
labor migration—from Mexico to the United States and Lesotho to South Africa—to argue that
the general conditions for easements in property might also apply to patterns of migration, thus
expanding the conception of what constitutes a border-crossing people that we might plausibly
derive from existing practice. Actually existing border-crossing easements, I will argue, should
not categorically exclude border crossing for the purposes of labor. I conclude with a brief
reconsideration of Miller’s arguments regarding immigration, and examine the exceptions to the
right to exclude that appear in his account. Miller’s theory can potentially make room for bordercrossing easements by necessity, but not border-crossing easements by prescription. I will close
by reflecting on Miller’s failure to recognize the possibility of border-crossing easements by
prescription, and what it might mean for his theory.
Border Exclusion: Prevention or Coercion?

Normative dimensions of immigration policy have garnered significant attention from political
theorists and philosophers recently. A central focus of this literature regards the justification of
restrictive immigration policies—can they be justified, and if so, how, and to what extent? A
number of scholars have emphasized just how difficult it is to justify border exclusions. In his
now-classic treatment of this issue, Joseph Carens emphasizes the challenge for justified migrant
exclusion:
Perhaps borders and guards can be justified as a way of keeping out criminals,
subversives, or armed invaders. But most of those trying to get in are not like that. They
are ordinary, peaceful people, seeking only the opportunity to build decent, secure lives
for themselves and their families. On what moral grounds can these sorts of people be
kept out? What gives anyone the right to point guns at them? (Carens 1987, 251)
Carens is not alone in characterizing such restrictions as difficult to justify (Abizadeh
2008; Child 2011; Cole 2000; Dummett 2001; Hidalgo 2014; Kukathas 2005; 2012; see also
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Carens 2013). While stopping short of an all-things-considered defense of a fully open borders
policy, theorists such as Carens demonstrate the power of the case against border restrictions and
set the threshold for exclusion quite high. In response, David Miller makes two arguments in an
effort to justify most immigration restrictions (Miller 2005; 2007, 201–30; 2010; 2011; 2012).
First, he argues theorists such as Carens and Arash Abizadeh (2008) have mischaracterized the
act of migrant exclusion in a way that exaggerates the threshold for justification. Second, he
affirms a collectivist Lockean right of national communities to craft restrictive immigration
policies as an act of democratic self-determination. In this chapter, I will not directly challenge
either of these positions. I will instead examine the foundations of Miller’s “national territorial
rights” position and its implications. On his own terms properly understood, he has exaggerated
the scope of just exclusion in at least one important way.
In a recent essay Miller concluded that “even if the United States is the favored
destination of the vast majority of Mexican immigrants, that fact alone does not give them a
special right to be represented in the making of US Border policy. The United States is not
coercing the Mexicans; nor is it single-handedly depriving them of the chance to lead
autonomous lives” (Miller 2010, 118). This observation came in the context of a debate between
Miller and Abizadeh regarding the appropriate way to characterize the act of refusing admittance
to a prospective migrant (Abizadeh 2010; Miller 2010). Abizadeh insists that such an act is an
act of coercion in the classic sense of the term: those denied entry by a restrictive border
enforcement regime have been subjected to autonomy-invading coercive state action, which
triggers a demand for democratic legitimation (Abizadeh 2008). Miller contends that under
normal circumstances, the act of exclusion at the border is not an act of coercion but an act of
prevention (Miller 2010). Prevention still requires justification, but at a considerably lower
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threshold—the demand for democratic justification, according to Miller, isn’t applicable in this
situation. Miller reaches this conclusion via an analogy between the private property rights of
individuals in possession of land or other real property, on the one hand, and national
communities in possession of a sovereign national territory, on the other. The right to prevent
entry into a territory by a national community (acting through her representative government) is
treated as analogous to a property owner refusing access to her property. As I will argue in the
next section, this analogy is central to Miller’s theory of national rights.
Miller’s position on Mexican migration to the United States, as stated above, does not
explicitly rule out the possibility of other reasons limiting the right to exclude in this case.
However, his other recent writings on immigration suggest he is likely to be skeptical. Miller has
elsewhere defended the right of national communities to restrict immigration, potentially quite
severely, in service of their legitimate, reasonable, and democratic quest to control and shape
“the way that their nation develops, including the values that are contained in the public culture”
(Miller 2005, 200). Miller notes that the right to exclude is not absolute: “claims of material
necessity—or more generally claims based on human rights—can sometimes place limits on
their exercise” (Miller 2007, 221). Preferences and desires of prospective migrants aside, the
“real question . . . is whether a decision to restrict immigration violates the human rights of those
who are excluded” (Miller 2011, 2033). Miller’s primary recognized exception to the right to
exclude follows the general international legal and moral consensus regarding legitimate asylum
seekers (while keeping open the possibility of recognition of economic refugees, a shift that has
the potential to expand the scope of legitimate asylees considerably). While this might seem to
be a significant exception, Miller contends that its moral force cannot simply be wielded against
the country of the would-be migrants’ choice, as “the claimant cannot choose who bears the
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specific remedial responsibility in his case” (Miller 2007, 221). Except for special cases of
emergency (such as someone adrift at sea, arriving in national waters, or fleeing immediate
political violence across a land border), it is up to each national community how to discharge
their fair share of remedial responsibilities with respect to refugees and asylum seekers. In other
words, the moral demand on national communities here contains a significant amount of
discretion in how “fair share” requirements are understood, and for whom asylum is granted.
Should no national community choose to accept a migrant with a legitimate asylum claim, they
may well have no recourse—they may simply have fallen through the “justice gap” between
“what people in poor countries can legitimately claim as a matter of justice (protection of their
human rights, especially) and what the citizens of rich countries are obliged, as a matter of
justice, to sacrifice to fulfill these claims” (Miller 2007, 274). In the absence of an effective
international regime governing refugee policy, states can violate their “fair share” obligations
without fear of effective recourse from excluded asylum seekers (Miller 2011; Owen 2010).
Rather than challenge Miller’s claim that a “mere” act of prevention does not trigger
democratic justification, I will argue that the reasoning that prompts Miller to classify exclusion
as “mere” prevention may be less amenable to the justification of restrictive immigration policies
than Miller currently suggests it is. Miller’s case ultimately rests on an analogy between private
property rights for individuals and territorial rights for nation-states. A more thorough
consideration of the implications of this analogy identifies potential limits on just exclusion that
Miller does not consider. Examining Miller’s position on its own terms, I argue specifically that
the national territorial rights thesis he defends may not justify his conclusion about the right to
exclude Mexican labor migrants from the United States and other similar acts of exclusion.
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Territory as a Form of Property

The case that the exclusion by force of a would-be border crosser is an act of prevention is easy
to make. Insofar as this claim is controversial, it is not in the claim that prevention is taking
place, but in the claim that the relevant act is “mere” prevention, and not a greater imposition. In
order to make the case that this is the proper register to understand such exclusions, Miller relies
heavily on the metaphor of the property owner, excluding others from access to her property. He
analogizes border control to a hypothetical Scottish landowner who warns all who might attempt
to access his private island that they would be met with violence, and to a homeowner who
refuses to grant his obnoxious and persistent neighbor access to his house (Miller 2010, 114–16).
But Miller does not solely rely on property analogies. He includes the following scenario:
“Suppose that Peter, very much wants Jane to have dinner with him, and proposes that they
should go to a nearby Thai restaurant. Jane, however, hates Thai food and makes it clear to Peter
that if he goes to the Thai [restaurant], she will not be joining him—a threat sufficiently grave
that Peter immediately drops his proposal” (Miller 2010, 113). It is clear, Miller argues, in this
case, that Jane does not invade Peter’s autonomy or coerce him through her act of refusal in this
scenario. For Miller’s purposes this analogy works if there are sufficient options beyond Thai
food to meet Peter’s basic needs (thus anticipating a potential exception for refugees in the
general right to exclude). But as Abizadeh notes, this analogy has a flaw: in the case of denying
someone a particular option they prefer in the course of a friendship, one is not backing up that
threat with the kind of coercive measures we associate with a state—“imprisonment, death, and
so on” (Abizadeh 2010, 126). Insofar as the illustrative examples Miller uses to establish the
noncoercive nature of territorial exclusion are apt, they rest, exclusively, on the private property
analogy.
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Of course, this does not require that the territorial rights of peoples are in every sense
identical to private property rights. Tamar Meisels, a fellow national territorial rights theorist and
territorial collectivist Lockean,2 gives an account of the important differences between individual
property and collective territorial rights: “property and sovereignty are two forms, or two
aspects, of ownership rights. Property in our connection refers to the ownership of land, while
sovereignty includes inter alia the right to make the laws concerning real estate (as well as other)
property” (Meisels 2009, 23; see also Meisels 2005, 5–8; Nine 2012, 11–13). The analogy
between (individual) private property and (collective) territorial sovereignty can survive the
obvious differences between the privileges that adhere to those rights, as they both generate the
kind of ownership rights appropriate to that particular kind of agent as well as the principles that
justify the type of ownership claim. For individual property owners, this means a collection of
rights geared toward productive economic activity, “quiet enjoyment,” and significantly, the
exclusion of other individuals in most cases (the latter may be limited in certain ways if the
property is used for commercial purposes in some jurisdictions, but for property used for
2

By “collectivist Lockean,” I refer to those who argue that territorial rights ought to be granted

to the collective entities. Generally, national communities, although Miller (2012) suggests
indigenous groups may sometimes qualify as well for reasons similar to those Locke argues grant
individual rights. Miller (2007; 2010; 2011; 2012), Meisels (2005; 2009) and Nine (2008; 2012)
defend different variants of collectivist Lockean positions. This stands in contrast to an
individualist Lockean justification for territorial rights. This position, defended by A. John
Simmons (2001) and Hillel Steiner (1996), holds that territorial rights are justified by individual
property rights, insofar as they are necessary to create an entity that can sufficiently protect such
property. This chapter will not address the individualist Lockean territorial argument.
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dwelling or other private purposes, the right to exclude remains robust under normal
circumstances). Territorial rights, adhering in national communities via the state as an
institutional proxy,3 produce jurisdictional and metajurisdictional powers,4 and other powers and
duties associated with norms of sovereignty. The difference between the specific content and
contours of rights that attach to these different forms of ownership is explained by a logic of
appropriateness or fit. The concrete nature of the rights and privileges that attach to each form of
ownership differ due to the different purposes of each form of ownership, and what is needed to
achieve that purpose. Individual ownership rights are shaped by what individuals do with land—
primarily, to live and engage in economic activity (as noted earlier, the right to exclude may
differ somewhat for these two kinds of ownership in ways that reflect the difference between
their purposes). Limits are placed on those rights insofar as those limits are necessary to make
property rights consistent with other important values and goals; for example, antipollution laws
and “takings” legislation may prove necessary to protect the health of the environment (and, as

3

Miller insists that these rights belong first and foremost to the national communities, and are

only contingently granted to “the state” as a placeholder for the national community. This
position has been criticized by a number of theorists who see the state as a stronger candidate for
holding territorial rights (Levy 2008; Laegaard 2007; Pevnick 2011; Stilz 2011). Recently Miller
has explicitly considered the possibility that territorial rights might adhere to groups other than
national communities, singling out indigenous groups as another promising candidate (Miller
2012).
4

On the importance of metajurisdictional rights for collectivist Lockean accounts, see Nine

2008.
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such, the value and usefulness of other people’s property) and to provide for adequate
infrastructure, respectively.
Similarly, the scope and limits of national communities’ territorial rights should fit with
the nature and purpose of those rights. One of the central purposes of national territories is selfgovernance, and as such the territorial rights of states include jurisdictional and
metajurisdictional rights over subjects and rights over territory (Nine 2008; Simmons 2001).5 It
is also argued that they contain what Simmons calls “rights against aliens” and what Miller
classifies at the right to exclude would-be immigrants (Miller 2005; 2007, 201–30; 2012;
Simmons 2001, 301). This, Miller argues, is necessary to fulfill at least one central purpose of
national territory—the right of national communities to attempt to shape and control the
development of their culture and economy (2005, 201). As with Lockean accounts of individual
property rights, the justification for this mode of ownership is bolstered by transformation. A
national community’s right to claim ownership of a particular territory (with the attendant right
to exclude) grows as the occupation and settlement leads to a physical transformation of that
territory (Kolers 2002, 34; Meisels 2005, 75–96; Miller 2007, 217–20). Just as a Lockean
individual property owner’s claim strengthens as he transforms the land (and renders it
economically efficient) through his labor, so does a national community gain a stronger claim via
transformation. In the case of a national community this process is transformative in a dialectical
fashion. National cultures shape the transformations of the land, but the physical and
5

Miller contends that jurisdictional rights are necessary for groups with a “repository of value”

in a particular parcel of land, in order for their ownership and control of that land to remain
secure (Miller 2012, 263). For a skeptical assessment of that account, and an argument for
collective private property rights in some cases, see Angell (2013).
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environmental features of the land, and the limitations and opportunities they provide, play a role
in shaping the national culture as well, such that the character of the land and the character of the
national community are deeply intertwined.
Occupation, settlement, and transformation justify a national communities’ territorial
claim in both backward-looking and forward-looking ways. Looking backward, it bolsters the
territorial claim against other potential claimants. Looking forward, it demonstrates an important
practical reason to recognize territorial rights claims of national communities—they are
particularly well positioned to benefit from this particular piece of territory, due to the
connection that now exists between the people and the land. This mutual connection between
national communities and the land they occupy equips Miller with a ready response to the
argument that it is difficult to make a national territory claim persuasively because most national
communities occupy territories obtained originally through conquest, occupation, or otherwise
problematic means. The territorial rights of national communities are not tied to a just initial
acquisition. While a national community that violently dispossesses other occupants for a piece
of land does not automatically acquire a right to that territory, they may do so over time, as
multiple generations live, settle, and transform the land. Past sins of acquisition are still
potentially morally relevant to the present-day community, but they may take the form of
(unspecified) national responsibilities for past wrongs, which are best discharged in ways that
don’t directly interfere with that national community’s existing territorial rights. The
“transformation” feature of territorial rights claims also provides a tool to evaluate the relative
strengths of competing claims, which are necessary in a world in which “unblemished title” is an
impossible standard (Miller 2007, 219–20).
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Extending the Analogy: Border-Crossing Easements

Whatever the shortcomings of the national territorial rights thesis and the analogy on which it
rests, it clearly captures something important about national communities and the territories they
occupy and govern. However, in the hands of national territorial rights theorists, the analogy is
applied in an overwhelmingly one-sided manner. It is deployed almost exclusively in ways that
serve to bolster the territorial rights of national communities to exclude. Miller does recognize
exceptions to exclusion, but as noted in part I they are significantly limited in scope and
application. I will return to a discussion of his limited exceptions in the final section. In this
section, I’ll identify a way in which the underlying logic of the property analogy might suggest
significant limitations on the right to exclude migrants, including Mexican labor immigrants to
the United States.
One way in which the property analogy has generated an argument against territorial
privileges of national communities has been through a critique of inherited birthright citizenship.
This inheritance, it is argued, is an illiberal form of privilege that troublingly resembles feudal
birthright, and as such presents a substantial challenge to those national communities that have
ostensibly liberal characters and commitments (Carens 1992; Shachar 2009; Stevens 2010).6 This
is certainly a way in which a property analogy could work against a strong right to exclude.
Whatever the merits of this argument, from a national territorial rights perspective it appears to
be a category error. It focuses on the rights of individual citizens rather than the rights of the
national community as such. By reducing this collective right to an individual right, this critique
of birthright citizenship fails to engage the national territorial rights claim on its own terms. As

6

For an argument that the feudal privilege analogy is inapt, see Pevnick 2011, 130–32.
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such is it not likely to be persuasive to those committed to a collective territorial right for
national communities that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts.
Can Miller’s robust account of just exclusion be challenged if we remain in the sphere of
collective territorial rights analogous to, but not reducible to, individual property rights? I believe
it can. In order to do so, I will explore one way in which individual property rights are limited by
convention and law, and the purpose of that limitation, and argue that something similar should
be applied to the territorial rights claims of national communities. I refer here to the law of
easements. An easement is a specific legal limitation that restricts a property owner in a
particular way.7 A common form of easement, for example, is the requirement to maintain a
route of access to another piece of property for its owners. In property law, the “dominant
tenement” holds an easement that restricts some aspect of the property use of the holder of a
particular piece of property (the “servient tenement”).
One way easements are created is by agreement, in other words, by contract. In legal
terms this is an express easement. In addition to basic contractual easements, however, there are
easements by prescription, easements by prior use, and easements by necessity. These are of
particular interest for the purposes of this analogy. This is but one example: “Besides right of
way, the law of easements included the right to place clothes on lines over neighboring land, the
right to nail fruit trees on a neighbor’s wall, and the rights to water cattle at a pond and take
water for domestic purposes” (Dukenminier et al. 2006, 670–71). Also included in the law of
easements are negative privileges—preventing a particular development or activity on a
particular parcel of land.
7

My discussion of easements in the following paragraphs draws heavily from Dukenminier et al.

2006, 667–740.
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Easements by necessity come into existence in a situation in which a parcel of property
would be significantly diminished in value without the use or access the easement protects. For
example, if I were to sell a piece of my property with no independent access to public roads
except through another section of my property, an easement would be necessary to allow access
to this new parcel. Insofar as it can be shown that a particular restriction on parcel A is necessary
for the enjoyment or use of parcel B, parcel A may be subject to an easement restriction.
Easements by necessity are usually created through lawsuits, in which the claim of necessity is
scrutinized and the costs of granting the easement are weighed against the costs that would be
borne by the servient tenement, should the easement be granted. While the standard of necessity
is generally quite high, easements by necessity are not strictly limited to questions of the
economic use value of the land. For example, many states grant easements by necessity to
descendants of those buried in private cemeteries to visit the grave of their ancestor.
Of even greater interest for my purposes are easements by prior use and easements by
prescription. These forms of easements do not rest on claims of necessity or prior agreement.
The specific rules of such easements vary by jurisdiction, but the idea is that an easement can be
created through the continued, specific use of a piece of property for a particular purpose over a
significant period of time. For example, under Kentucky law, “an easement, such as a right of
way, is created when the owner of a tenement to which the right is claimed to be appurtenant, or
those under whom he claims title, have openly, peaceably, continuously, under a claim of right
adverse to owners of the soil, and with his knowledge and acquiescence, used a way over the
lands of another for as much as 13 years” (Dukenminier et al. 2006, 677). The strength of a claim
to an easement is increased by a demonstrable improvement of an accessway (such as paving a
road) by those who are claiming the easement. In other words, the extent to which the
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prospective dominant tenement has invested in or improved a particular land use increases the
strength of their legal claim to continued use via an easement.
Easements by prescription can be created in two ways. The first is described in the
preceding paragraph. The second, a combination of the logic of necessity and the logic of
prescription, is also of potential relevance to the idea of border-crossing easements: “the
easement is implied when the court finds the claimed easement is necessary to the enjoyment of
the claimant’s land and that the necessity arose when the claimed dominant parcel was severed
from the claimed servient parcel” (Dukenminier et al. 2006, 688). In other words, when a
particular property border is created through a division of a parcel in such a way that creates the
necessity of a particular use of the servient tenement by the dominant tenement, this may
produce a claim of easement by necessity.
The law of easements discussed here draws from US law, but easements as a legal
category of property law is both older and broader than its current American application. Modern
easement law is a product of the common law tradition, but the genealogy goes back quite a bit
further: easements have been characterized as “the most Roman part of English law”
(Dukenminier et al. 2006, 668n2). The specific history of easements in the common law tradition
dates back to the breakup of the feudal order and the enclosure of the commons. As common
fields were becoming patchwork-private plots, the need for owners of particular plots to have
access to them became encoded in property law. While the specific content and purpose of
easement law has changed over time, a consistent theme of easement law has been recognition
that property rights are imbedded in a social, ecological, geographical, and historical context that
cannot, in some cases, be entirely escaped by the current title holder. Medieval property law
contained extraordinary complexities that have since been substantially simplified. These
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simplifications have been useful—indeed, probably necessary—for the flourishing of
commercial and industrial society. But as useful as they are, they remain useful fictions. The
persistence of easement law demonstrates a limit of this useful fiction, as they directly confront
the specific costs to others of unfettered freedom of property and resolve those claims in ways
that acknowledge the legal/moral significance of existing historical practices over unlimited
freedom to dispose of one’s own property. With property easements, this historical sequence has
been completed; with border-crossing easements the third step has so far proceeded in an ad hoc
manner, limited to a handful of cases discussed in section V below.
The next two sections examine empirical examples of laws, practices, and customs that
take the form of border-crossing easements, and the normative case for granting easements in
cases of long-standing, economically and culturally embedded labor migration, respectively.
Before turning to these examples, I want to briefly consider some ways in which some existing
logics of citizenship and immigration law and practice are similar to the logic of border-crossing
easements offered here. The factors that should motivate the recognition of border-crossing
easements are also present in migration and citizenship law in a variety of other ways.
Obviously, time is significant to easements. An easement by prescription is based on the length
of time of a particular use or practice. There is historical precedent to a temporal dimension to
United States citizenship law as well. Prior to the 14th Amendment, “there is very strong
evidence that a temporally based principle of citizenship . . . was treated as decisive when,
following the founding, the U.S. Supreme Court and many state courts issued their decisions
about the status of the first U.S. residence to whom irregular citizenship status was ascribed”
(Cohen 2011, 575–76). Prior to the restrictive turn in immigration policy in the 1920s, there were
a number of provisions limiting the government’s prerogative to deport settled, long-term
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residents, and “discretionary mechanisms” for such individuals to adjust their status (Shachar
2013, 136; Ngai 2004, 59–90). In a host of nineteenth-century court decisions, the duration of
residency was a crucial factor in determining citizenship status of residents.8 Indeed, the earliest
federal deportation laws were limited to those who had been residing in the United States up to
only one year (later changed to five years). In the 1940s and 1950s, Congress created legal
mechanisms to avoid deportation for long-term residents (Ngai 2010, 58–60). Such arrangements
exist in other countries as well. In France, until 2003, legal resident status was available to
anyone who could demonstrate ten years of residence (Carens 2010, 21). In addition to the
relevance of time to citizenship law, changing definitions of family have played an important
role. Time is not the only familiar dimension of the logic of easements in existing citizenship
law. During World War II, a number of American soldiers married while serving abroad. For the
majority of the “war brides” from Europe, this presented no legal challenges based on current
immigration law. But for the approximately 25 percent of the brides who were from Asia
(primarily China), the situation was quite different. Their admission to the United States, even as
spouses of current citizens, would be in direct conflict with the notoriously racist laws that had
severely restricted Asian immigration over the previous several decades. This was initially dealt
with in a fairly ad hoc fashion—via a hastily passed “War Brides Act” in 1945, designed to “cut
the red tape” and otherwise circumvent long-standing immigration law and practice (Wolgin and
Bloemraad 2010, 35).
8

For a forceful argument that the temporal dimension should play a role in adjudicating the fate

of irregular migrants today, see Carens (2010). Mae Ngai (2003) has argued that allowing legal
residence after a period of time in residence is simply to place a statute of limitations on the
crime of illegal border crossing.
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How do these stories from the history of immigration and citizenship laws relate to the
concept of border-crossing easements? In the first case, I merely seek to demonstrate that the
temporal principle that underlies the concepts of easements by prescription has long had a
place—sometimes a prominent one—in our thinking and adjudication about citizenship. I raise
the issue of the Asian war brides and their legal accommodation to make the following point: it
is not unprecedented to grant exceptions to general rules and laws regarding immigration if doing
so is necessary to meet some other broadly agreed-upon value or goal. The flourishing of
intimate family life required such an exception.9 Border-crossing easements, as I’ll show in the
following sections, are also necessary for the flourishing of long-standing economic and cultural
arrangements. In both cases, respecting autonomy means granting exceptions, and easements is
one form these exceptions can take.
Consider the logic of the centrality of family reunification in contemporary immigration
law. As long as legal immigration routes to developed countries remain a scarce resource, a
strong case could be made for placing refugees on a par with, or higher than, family reunification
in immigration (Gibney 2004; Honohan 2009). Why does family reunification continue to
occupy a central place in current immigration law?10 Why should this particularistic

9

This exception shouldn’t have been necessary, of course: the stated goal behind anti-Asian

immigration laws at the time was explicitly and openly racist. But my point here regards merely
the exception, rather than the general rule—an exception to a rule can be justified on its own
terms, separately from any examination of the justifiability of the rule itself.
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consideration take precedence over more universal measures of desert, or fairness? One possible
answer is that migration regimes should be constructed so as to make current migration practices
consistent with the development of one’s intimate family life and culture. In this sense, the
impetus behind family reunification as a top priority in immigration could, arguably, be
leveraged to support border-crossing easements as well.
Obviously, there is currently no law, national or international, designed to provide
specific guidance for granting or recognizing border-crossing easements in the sense that there
does exist for property easements. But this is not a reason to abandon the idea. Recall the
common law origins of easement law: easements emerged from changes in the practice of
property ownership and allocation that took place during the breakdown of the feudal order.
Changes in actual practices rendered a new legal category necessary, and it was developed in a
bottom-up, ad hoc manner to respond to that challenge before it became a body of codified and
general law. As James Scott recently noted, “The movement from practice to custom to rights
inscribed in law is an accepted pattern in both common and positive law” (Scott 2012, 16). A
case could certainly be made that past and current practices of migration, in light of an increasing
trend to monitor, police, and restrict national borders by nation-states, represent analogous
conditions to generate border-crossing easements, and existing legal arrangements of the sort
discussed in this section could be seen as the early stages of ad hoc development of bordercrossing easements, not yet identified as such.

“family” should be rethought to consider a variety of nontraditional forms, see Lister (2007) and
Holland (2008).
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Actually Existing Border-Crossing Easements

Easements are a form of servitude in property law, so the first place to look for such
arrangements is the law of international servitudes, in particular those servitudes that relate to a
right of free passage across sovereign territory.11 One area in which such an arrangement has
frequently come up is for enclaves—pockets of sovereign territory entirely surrounded by
another country. In such cases, it is common for a right of passage from the enclave to the main
body of territory of the state to which it belongs. A good example here is Llivia—a small
Spanish town in the Pyrenees, removed from the main border by several miles and entirely
surrounded by French sovereign territory. While the Schengen agreement has rendered the right
of free passage to this enclave redundant, it existed for many centuries—from the creation of the
modern border in 1659, which intended to cede Llivia to France but failed to do so through
“defective wording in the Treaty of the Pyrenees” (Catudal 1974, 123; see also Krenz 1961, 65–
70; Sahlins 1989) until the late twentieth century. The road from the border to Llivia, known as
the chemin neutre (“Neutral Road”) was open to Llivia residents on a permanent basis (Catudal
1974, 120). Even as both French and Spanish authorities chafed at the cost of this arrangement—
“This enclave provides a livelihood for a Corps of French and Spanish customs officials almost
as numerous as the rest of its inhabitants” (Farran 1955, 298)—the right of free passage persisted
as an obligation for both states for hundreds of years. Llivia is not unique among enclaves in this
respect. According to a number of scholars of enclaves in international law, there is a right of
access for enclave residents, as well as a variety of state officials, that while not absolute, should
11

On international servitudes in general, see Reid (1932) and Vali ([1958] 1986). On the right of

transit in general, see Lauterpacht (1958). On the right of transit as it relates to enclaves, see
Catudal (1974), Farran (1955), and Krenz (1961).
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be understood as a requirement of customary international law (Catudal 1974, 130–31; Farran
1955, 304; Krenz 1961, 138–46). When India denied Portugal access from the coastal colony of
Daman to the interior enclaves of Dadra and Nagar Evili in 1954, the International Court of
Justice responded with the finding that “Portugal possessed a right of transit for goods, private
persons, and officials” between the coastal territory and interior enclaves, and India was required
to permit access under international law (Krenz 1961, 64–65).12 The customary international law
surrounding access to enclaves appears to be the most obvious international analogy for
easement law. But there are other examples: international law has long recognized a number of
transit rights and usage rights that fall under the category of international servitudes.13
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for specific subnational groups for whom international border
restrictions impose a significant hardship to have some form of special border-crossing rights. De
facto and de jure border-crossing privileges have been granted for reasons conceptually similar
to the logic of easements suggested here. The remainder of this section identifies and explores
examples of such “border-crossing easements.”
Legal border-crossing privileges on the US/Canada border for indigenous peoples date
back to the Jay Treaty of 1794, in which the United States and Great Britain agreed that “Indians
dwelling on either side of said boundary line, freely to pass and re-pass by land or inland
navigation, into the respective territories and countries of the two parties, on the continent of
America” (Osburn 1999, 472). These border-crossing rights were reaffirmed explicitly after the
War of 1812 in the Treaty of Ghent and went largely unchallenged until the anti-immigration
12
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movement of the 1920s. They were severely curtailed in the 1924 Immigration and
Naturalization Act. However, the Supreme Court effectively reinstated native treaty rights just
four years later in U.S. ex rel. Diablo v. McCandless. In 1952 a 50 percent blood quantum
requirement was added, but this was again replaced by simple possession of tribal identity cards
by the 1980s, returning determination of tribal membership to the tribes (Luna-Firebaugh 2002,
162–63; Osburn 1999, 474–79). In the case of the United States’ northern border, the analogous
type of easement is an express easement; these border-crossing rights, while reflecting longstanding cultural and historic practices, are based on treaty law.14 A similar express easement
was negotiated on behalf of indigenous residents of western Alaska and northeastern Russia in
the early 1990s, shortly after relations between the United States and Russia improved following
the collapse of the Soviet Union (Osburn 1999, 481–82).
On the southern US border, the situation is more complex and tenuous, and existing
border-crossing rights for indigenous peoples have deteriorated in recent years (Singleton 2008).
Some indigenous groups have received express easements through law, others have been granted
border-crossing rights via ad hoc administrative rules, and others have no border-crossing rights
at all. The clearest case of a recognized border-crossing easement can be found with the
Kickapoo. Originally from the Great Lakes region, the Kickapoo tribe moved around
considerably beginning early in the nineteenth century “as a result of broken land treaties and a
desire to resist the forces of colonization” (Luna-Firebaugh 2002, 168). Some subgroups of the
14
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understood as treaty rights or whether the relevant treaties have been entirely superseded by
statute. The latter case is made by Yablon-Zug (2008), while the treaty rights case is made by
Lewerenz (2010).
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Kickapoo briefly settled in Texas, but due to local hostilities moved south to Mexico, where they
were granted land and citizenship by the Mexican government, in exchange for military service
(Osburn 1999, 480). Meanwhile, the US government established a Kickapoo reservation in
Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma) in 1883. The two branches of the Kickapoo tribe
subsequently “maintained close relations through intermarriage and frequent visitation” (Osburn
1999). The Mexican Kickapoo lived year-round in Mexico until the 1950s, when a series of
droughts forced an annual labor migration to Eagle Pass, Texas. The centrality of free passage
across the US-Mexico border for the economy and culture of the Kickapoo tribe was
acknowledged by the INS, which issued tribal identity cards that enabled free passage for all
tribal members (of Mexican and US citizenship) in the 1950s. This administrative easement was
formalized into law in 1983, when the Texas Band of Kickapoo Act was passed, which granted
free and unlimited passage of the US-Mexico border for all tribal members. The cultural
necessity of continued free passage was explicitly noted in this legislation (Osburn 1999, 480–
81).
This is the most clear-cut present border crossing easement on the US-Mexico border,
and while it became an express easement in 1983, it was clearly recognized as an easement right
prior to that, as that legislation codified existing informal INS privileges. Other groups have had
similar arrangements. The Cocopah peoples’ traditional lands were separated by the Gadsden
Purchase, but they continued to cross freely until the 1930s. After an initial crackdown, the
Cocopah “developed an unofficial agreement with the INS that allowed for freedom of passage
of Mexican Cocopah into the U.S.” (Luna-Firebaugh 2002, 167). The Yaqui’s homeland was not
directly split by the border, but Yaqui subgroups resided on both sides. Furthermore, the Yaqui
practice religious ceremonies that require the presence of religious leaders from other regions,
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often across the border. The Yaqui came to an agreement with the INS Arizona regional office in
1997, which allowed Yaqui leaders to identify and sponsor religious leaders from Mexican
Yaqui communities to cross the border for these ceremonies (Luna-Firebaugh 2002, 174). The
Tohono O’odham, whose territory in Southern Arizona extends into the state of Sonora, have
long sought recognition for a border-crossing easement, which is particularly urgent in their case
since about 10 percent of registered tribal members are Mexican nationals (making them the only
US tribe to grant full tribal membership to non-US citizens). A traditional unofficial bordercrossing location for O’odham members was quietly ignored by the INS for decades. Recent
border enforcement strategies have complicated this arrangement, as nonindigenous illicit border
crossings have been pushed farther away from population centers and brought disruption, crime,
and border guards to O’odham territory (Cadava 2011; Luna-Firebaugh 2002, 166). As a result,
the nonofficial border crossing has been closed, imposing a significant hardship on the Mexican
tribal members, who are now forced to make a several hour trip to visit friends or relatives,
receive medical care, or otherwise participate in tribal activities just a few miles away from their
home (Ellingham 2004, 122–36). O’odham leaders continue to negotiate special “laser visas” for
tribal members, which would presumably ensure their members are permitted by immigration
officials to cross the border, but not address the geographical problem (Luna-Firebaugh 2002,
170–73).
An argument could be made that the Tohono O’odham have a uniquely strong case for
border crossing rights (Ozer 2002). Their presence on the border substantially predates the
Kickapoo (and, of course, the border itself). While the Kickapoo’s border crossing dates back to
the early 1800s, the Tohono O’odham have been crossing the present-day border for, at a
minimum, several hundred years before contact with European settlers. The Kickapoo must cross
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the border to get from one territory to another, whereas the border split the Tohono O’odham’s
homeland. So why was the Kickapoo border-crossing easement legislatively successful, whereas
the Tohono O’odham not? The details of the failed legislation are important here. In both cases
in which a legislative border passage right was pursued, there was broad agreement between the
tribe and the US government regarding the need for and justice of a border-crossing right for
tribal members. In both cases, the sticking point became how the border would be crossed. In
both cases the US and Mexican governments insisted that border crossing could only take place
at officially recognized border crossings, whereas the Tohono O’odham insisted on being
permitted to cross the border on their own land, via customary migration paths (Luna-Firebaugh
2002, 170–71).15 This was a cultural necessity, but also a practical matter, as crossing at an
official border checkpoint would force a 120-mile trip to visit a village a few miles away
(Osburn 1999, 149). Indeed, the traditional migratory routes had been used: “The O’odham
maintain an unofficial border crossing on tribal lands that, while known to U.S. customs, is not
regulated by the U.S. government” (Luna-Firebaugh 2002, 166). However, this arrangement
became untenable as new restrictive border enforcement efforts pushed other border crossers and
smugglers into more remote territory, bringing law enforcement with them and severely
disrupting life in the Tohono O’odham’s territory (Madsen 2007; 2014). In other words, the idea
that a border-crossing easement for the O’odham is both needed and deserved was never in
doubt—the easement failed for reasons related to the challenge of implementation, especially
15
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their medical clinic in 2001–2, but by 2004 they had abandoned this service, as both the
increased presence of border guards, and the increased danger from criminal activity associated
with border crossing had rendered the shuttle impractical (Ellingwood 2004, 122–36).
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insofar as it might conflict with the US government’s renewed and reinvigorated effort to
aggressively police the border. Prior to the significant increase in border enforcement, the
O’odham’s informal crossing was tolerated by various agents of the US government because
there was no reason to believe anyone else might seek to take advantage of it, given its remote
location. With the militarization of less remote sections of the border, this was increasingly not
the case. This easement fell apart because it conflicted with a higher priority for the state, not
because the force of the claim was rejected.
It might be argued that indigenous peoples are a special case, because their status as (a)
sociopolitical forms that predate the state that were also (b) subjected to all manner of indignities
by those states that now separate them, they might have a different and much more substantial
case to make for border-crossing easements. In particular, one could argue their status as
sociopolitical entities that predate the settlement of modern states imbues them with a claim for
accommodations and rights that is qualitatively different, and more demanding, than any other
sort of plausible subnational group claim. Indigenous peoples can point to the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which includes a statement of support for
indigenous border-crossing rights in Article 36.16 I would certainly grant that indigenous border16

Article 36 of the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples reads:

1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders, have the right to
maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual,
cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own members as well as other
peoples across borders.
2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take effective measures
to facilitate the exercise and ensure the implementation of this right.
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crossing easements may be among the most morally and politically compelling. Such claims are
not, however, irreducibly unique. The justification for indigenous border-crossing easements and
those of nonindigenous labor migrants are based on broadly similar principles. First, the length
of time the border has been crossed (and the length of time the geography of the community has
necessitated border crossing); second, the cultural and economic importance of the border
crossing; third, the hardship or harm done through the act of border creation and the ongoing
policies of restricted access. For each of these criteria, the indigenous claims to border-crossing
easements, while often quite strong, are not qualitatively unique.
I have focused here on border-crossing easement-like arrangements at US borders. There
are many non-US border examples of such arrangements, however, including the legal
recognition of border-crossing rights of the Sami people in northern Scandinavia, which date
back to at least 1751, when the Lapp Codicil was added to the Stromstrad border treaty between
Sweden and Norway. This granted the “Lapp people” the formal right to cross the border
between these two countries to continue their long-standing practice of nomadic reindeer herding
(Henrikson 2008, 28; Hannum 1990, 247–62; Lantto 2010). Under provisions of the Torres Strait
Treaty of 1985, residents of certain villages in the Torres Strait islands have legal permission to
cross the maritime border between Australia and Papua New Guinea “to visit and trade with one
another without having to go through formal customs inspection, passport control or other
formalities” (Arthur 2001, 219). Since 1967, the Druze people of the Golan Heights have found
The Declaration, adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2007, can be found at
www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. For a thoughtful assessment of the
possibility of using this treaty to reassert and defend Jay Treaty rights for Native Americans at
the US-Canada border, see Garrow (2012).
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themselves separated by a new international border from the rest of their people. Even as tense
relations have led to a closed border for most Israelis and Syrians, the Qunietra Crossing has
been open to residents of four Druze villages in the northern Golan Heights only, for the
purposes of attending school, family events, visiting significant religious sites, and commerce (in
the form of apple sales) in Syria (Ashkenazi and Khoury 2013; Einav 2010). Examples of
easement-like arrangements for border-crossing peoples are, if not routine, not entirely unusual.
Searching for Border-Crossing Easements:
Mexico–United States and Lesotho–South Africa

The previous section establishes that “border-crossing easements” do, in fact, exist. But which
groups should be granted border-crossing easements? Most of the examples of successful bordercrossing easements identified in the previous section fall under two categories—indigenous
peoples and residents of enclaves. These are perhaps two of the easiest cases for border-crossing
easements, but the case for expanding the concept beyond them is strong. In this section, I want
to explore two cases I believe are eligible for a border-crossing easement, due to the central role
a pattern of labor migration plays in the society, culture, and identities of the would-be dominant
tenement. The two cases are Mexican labor migration to the United States (particularly from
parts of Mexico with a robust and long-standing culture of labor migration, such as many rural
Oaxacan villages) and Lesothan labor migration to South Africa.17 I will give an account of some
of the salient features of these two cases for our purposes before making the case that they may
qualify as border-crossing easements.
First, the specific location of both of these borders has historical origins in the
prerogative of the wealthier and more powerful country. In this case “both borders were
17
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established through a process of war, resistance, and domination” and “the conquered local
people were not consulted as to where the border would inevitably run” (Coplan 2010, 55). The
US-Mexico border was the product of a protracted nineteenth-century struggle in which the
United States effectively seized a considerable portion of Mexican territory, in which itinerant
labor had (and continued to) moved freely. At the time of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
approximately 100,000 Mexican citizens (as well as twice as many Native Americans) resided in
the territory ceded to the United States (Nevins 2002, 19). The present-day American Southwest
was severed from Mexico politically, but the social, cultural, and economic ties between these
territories were not. The border remained unstable and virtually unpoliced for many decades, as
the initial boundary between America and Mexico in this newly acquired territory was racial
rather than geographic.
Similarly, Lesotho’s current border with the South African Free State to the west was
shaped through conflict with the Orange Free State Republic in the mid-nineteenth century, in
which virtually all of the Lesothan western lowlands were ultimately lost to the Boer Republic
(which later merged with South Africa after the second Boer war). The borders of modern
Lesotho were settled when the British agreed to make what was left of Lesotho a protectorate in
1868, after nearly two decades of fighting a losing war of attrition, thus preventing any territorial
concessions to the Orange Free State. At its founding, Lesotho became, effectively, a labor
reserve for the rest of South Africa—the agriculturally productive lowland region of the country
was now almost entirely gone, leaving scarce options for domestic employment (Coplan 2001;
Mensah and Naidoo 2011). The country that was once known as the “granary of the Orange Free
State” (Ferguson 1994, 65) saw its status as a major agricultural exporter decline rapidly, to the
point that it was no longer close to agricultural self-sufficiency. This decline has multiple
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causes—the disruptions of the Orange Free State wars in the 1850s and ’60s and the
aforementioned loss of fertile agricultural land in 1868 to the Orange Free State, but also the
development of a system of labor migration in which investment in agricultural activity and
capacity declined precipitously (Coplan 2001). While the inequality in drawing the border is
historical, the inequality in defining the border is contemporary. In both cases discussed here it is
the more powerful, wealthier state, the United States and South Africa, that has attempted to
create a highly restrictive border regime where a largely open border had once existed. In both
cases, the present-day character of the border is not defined by the policies and enforcement
regimes of the Mexican and Lesothan governments to any significant degree.
Also, in both of these cases labor migration has a deep and long history, dating back
approximately one and a half centuries. This practice has long contained a great deal of
exploitation and unfair treatment of workers, but it could also be characterized as beneficial to
both sides.18 Economic development on both sides of each of these borders has been shaped and
driven by these migratory practices for some time. But these long-standing patterns and practices
of migration have not merely shaped the economic path of both nations, they have shaped (and
been shaped by) a culture of migration that has taken hold in virtually all of Lesotho and a
number of regions in Mexico. As Miller (2007, 218–21) argues, just as a national community
transforms and is transformed by the land such that they become a fit for each other, so too do
long-standing migratory patterns and practices.
Lesotho “has served as a labor reserve supplying migrant wage labor to South African
mines, farms and industry for more than a century” (Ferguson 1994, 26; Murray 1981). The
18
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centrality of labor migration in Lesotho dates back to the period of the Orange Free State wars,
during which time Basothan19 men sought work in Natal and the Cape to escape the war. After
the settlement of the boundary, two facts drove the practice of labor migration to become
widespread and permanent: the aforementioned loss of the fertile agricultural portion of the
Basothan homeland in the west, and the opening of labor-intensive diamond mines in nearby
Kimberley. Basothan labor migrants were pushed, but also pulled, across the border. By the end
of the nineteenth century, the vast majority of men of working age sought passes for work
outside the territory (Murray 1981). The agricultural productivity of Lesotho continued to
decline as much of the labor force spent their working years in South Africa—for many years, in
the mines, and more recently on Free State and Transvaal farms (Coplan 2010; Ulicki and Crush
2007). The particular pattern of migration in which men of working age spent between six and
ten months a year or more working abroad, but women were not allowed to take work in South
Africa, had a profound impact on gender roles, the nature of marriage, and the structure of family
relations in Lesotho (Coplan and Thoahlane 1995; Modo 2001; Murray 1981, 110–19). The
relationship between family, work, and conceptions of masculinity in Lesotho are now such that
“men in rural areas of Lesotho generally do not consider work on one’s family farm as legitimate
work” (Mensah and Naidoo 2011, 1030). South Africa’s development was also shaped by these
migratory patterns and their malleability. When NUM, the primary mineworkers union, became
too militant in the view of the South African state, the presence of foreign workers (primarily
Basothan, who were often among the most skilled miners and the most militant union leaders)
became a valuable tool in undermining union power, as they could be deported and sent to other
19
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locations when they reapplied for work. Migratory patterns became a useful tool for the
manipulation of labor relations for the South African regime (Coplan 2001, 96–98). The
migratory pattern has even been politically useful—in 1994 a significant number of Basothans in
South Africa were promised permanent resident documents in exchange for their vote for the
ANC. The following year, South African president Nelson Mandela made a public pledge that
Basothan migrant workers would not be denied access to work in mines (Mensah and Naidoo
2011, 1018–19). In sum—the migratory practices of Basothans have, over time, played a
significant role in shaping and reshaping the economy, society, politics, and culture of South
Africa. Furthermore, a culture of labor migration for virtually all competent working-age men
has been central to Lesothan society for much of the same time.
As with Lesotho, Mexican labor migration to the United States has been a feature of life
since the boundary was established in the nineteenth century. As the new American territories
seized at the conclusion of the Mexican-American War were settled and developed, Mexican
labor migration played an important role. In particular, the agricultural economy of the American
West came to rely on a shifting, itinerant population of workers at certain times of the year; the
manpower to complete the harvest would have otherwise been impossible given the scarcity of
local available labor. Temporary Mexican labor migration, from regions near the border but also
from southern Mexican regions such as Oaxaca (Cohen 2003), became central to the
development of the economy of the US Southwest, providing labor flexibility that intraAmerican migratory practices did not. The economy of the American West could not have
developed as it did without Mexican labor migration. This long-standing pattern of migration
has, predictably, deeply shaped Mexican communities as well. The practice of labor migration
has been a central feature of cultural and family life in many parts of Mexico for over one
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hundred years (Cohen 2003; Coplan 2010; Kandel and Massey 2002; Wilson 2010). The social
dynamic of (mostly male) long-term migration and (mostly female) migratory communities in
parts of rural Mexico has had a profound role in shaping gender norms, relations, and
expectations as well as family patterns. On the economic front, recent evidence suggests that
remittances from US-employed labor migrants are a major engine of economic development in
parts of Mexico where labor migration is common (Orrenius et al. 2012). The culture of
temporary, cyclical out-migration can be seen as “a set of interrelated perceptions, attitudinal
orientations, transnational social networks, growing out of the international migratory
experience, which constantly encourage, validate, and facilitate participation in this movement”
(Cornelius 1990, 24).
The legal status of these migratory practices has changed considerably over time. That
said, their status as licit (if not necessarily legal) practices remained largely unchanged—in both
societies; the practice of labor migration (including, at times, labor migration outside the law)
was both expected and normal on both sides of the border. Changes in the legal status of
migration (and the relevance of that legal status to the actual experiences of migrants) have
remained largely in the hands of the more powerful country in each pair, the United States and
South Africa. For both countries, the manipulable nature of the legal status of migrants from the
other country has served as an economic and political resource, to be altered to meet the different
and changing needs (as previously noted with respect to labor organizing in South African
mines). In the case of the United States, policies and enforcement have shifted over time as well,
with a similar dynamic. Initially, there was virtually no border enforcement. Between 1890 and
1930, the Mexican border became an object of concern, first as a circuitous route for unwanted
and illegal Asian immigration, and later as part of a general turn against immigration in the
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1920s, which would only intensify in the 1930s. During this time the US government also saw
the Mexican border as a potential financial resource, offering “work permits” to would-be
migrants at rates few could afford (Nevins 2002). Still, during this time enforcement was
sufficient only to moderately disrupt or complicate labor migration for a few, rather than
preventing or significantly altering the flow of migrants. By the early 1990s, however, the flow
of migration from Mexico became another kind of political resource; namely, a stage for
politicians to engage in a performance of sovereignty in the form of a “crackdown” on “illegal”
immigration (Andreas 2009; Brown 2010; Nevins 2002). This may have been useful for the
politicians engaged in it, but its consequences for the culture of migration was not to end it but to
alter the flow; under the new regime of fences and expanded border enforcement, labor migrants
shifted from temporary to permanent (as multiple border crossings became too risky). Coyotes—
smugglers of labor immigrants—became more profitable and powerful, changing the
demographics of who can afford to migrate, and border crossings became more deadly as they
were pushed out into the harsher desert (Nevins 2002).
This historical account of these migratory patterns suggests several reasons why they
might trigger a justified demand for an easement. One way to make the case for border-crossing
easements would be to observe that the very idea of states “controlling borders” is a relatively
recent imposition on the ancient and venerable practice of human migration, which has been a
central feature of human civilization for far longer than national communities or states have
existed, let alone the much more recent practice of attempted control of border crossings, and
explains how our species came to occupy most of the habitable territory on the planet in the first
place. On this perspective it is not migration that disrupts the nation-state but the nation-state that
disrupts migration (Brubaker 2010). While this view has a certain appeal, the spirit of easement
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law is not so radical. It is, instead, a minor supplement to the system of private property rather
than a radical challenge to it. I presume a similar scope for border-crossing easements.
The central purpose of easements is the continued use and enjoyment of property. Insofar
as a particular pattern of property use/access has become central to the relevant parties’
continued enjoyment of their property, restriction on one parcel can be created to facilitate that
continued practice. Something similar could be said to exist with respect to these patterns of
labor migration. First, the migratory patterns here are long-standing. Easements by prescription
are developed over time, as patterns of use become embedded and habitual. While minor details
have changed, both of these migratory patterns have persisted for well over a century. Second,
the cultures and economies of the equivalent of the dominant tenement (Lesotho and Mexico)
have been shaped and altered considerably by this practice. These migration patterns have been
tolerated or even encouraged by the servient tenement (United States and South Africa), but have
also played a role in “improving” the economy of servient tenement, through the provision of
flexible, temporary labor whenever and wherever it is needed. Just as the claim for an easement
is bolstered if the would-be dominant tenement has made improvements to the land, the bordercrossing easement claim should also be similarly bolstered. For better or for worse, the local
cultures and economies of the dominant tenement have been significantly shaped by the longstanding pattern of return migration. This has been done with the quiescence of the would-be
servient tenements, who have, in fact, used these migratory patterns (and their own ability to
manipulate them) in pursuit of their own political and economic projects. Third, the legal claim
for an easement by prescription is bolstered when the initial severance of the two parcels of land
placed the would-be dominant tenement in a difficult position without the easement. The
moment of severance (the creation of the modern border—the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and
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the Gadsden Purchase in 1848 and 1853, respectively, and the creation of modern-day Lesotho as
a British Protectorate in 1868) placed potentially significant limits on the continued enjoyment of
the would-be dominant parcel without the easement. The basic ingredients for a justified
easement claim are clearly present in both cases. If easements are good property law, and the law
of individual property ownership serves as the metaphorical foundation of the territorial rights of
national communities, should not those territorial rights be subject to claims of easements?
Are National Territorial Rights and Border-Crossing Easements Compatible?
In the final section of this chapter, I return to David Miller’s theory of immigration and consider
his account of exceptions to the right to exclude in light of the preceding discussion of bordercrossing easements.20 Miller’s writing on immigration suggests he might accept border-crossing
easements by necessity but reject border-crossing easements by prescription. I will attempt to
explain why Miller might be inclined to make this distinction, given his larger commitments, and
why it is nevertheless a mistake to do so.
No particular form of ownership automatically generates a general or absolute right to
exclude. Identifying a person or collective as an “owner” is the beginning, rather than the end, of
a discussion of the particular rights that resource ownership entails (Pevnick 2011, 43). Each
form of ownership generates a specific set of legal exclusions that are tied to the purpose of that
particular form of ownership. While ownership usually entails some exclusion rights, the
contents of those exclusion rights vary considerably, based on the point of the kind of property
right being claimed. For example, a racist who does not wish to associate with African
20

The method used in this chapter—drawing lessons from common law tradition with respect to

individuals and applying those lessons to national communities—is one that Miller employs with
respect to the inheritability of responsibility for harm. See Miller (2007, 148–50).
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Americans in any capacity has a right to categorically exclude them from her private residence,
but not her restaurant. This reflects a legal distinction between the purpose of private residences
and businesses shaped by civil rights legislation; the latter is public in a way that the former is
not, and as such it is a form of property that is more subject to limitations based on the public
value of racial equality. Or, to consider this from another angle, consider the exclusions
generated by intellectual property. If you published a book, you would have no right whatsoever
to exclude African Americans—or any other paying customer—from reading it. You do,
however, retain a host of exclusion rights as an intellectual property holder in this case.
Specifically, you (and/or your publisher) would have the right to exclude any reproductions or
use of the copyrighted material beyond what relevant statutes determine is “fair use.” Finally,
consider the recent revolution in Australian constitutionalism. Since Queensland v. Mabo (1992),
the founding doctrine of terra nullius (empty land) has been replaced by a system in which
“native title” claims can be made, in which Australian Aboriginals’ long-standing cultural and
spiritual ties to the land can provide a kind of legal title. It isn’t straightforward ownership,
however, that they have been granted in most cases, but rather a combination of ceremonial
rights, dwelling rights, and some light commercial rights. Pastoral rights and mineral extraction
rights have generally remained in the hands of the pre-Mabo economic interests that own them.
“Native title” is a particular form of ownership that entails some privileges but not others—
presumably, the privileges that are historically and culturally relevant for traditional native land
use (Glaskin 2003; Hinchman and Hinchman 1998).21
21

I am not making an argument here that native title under Mabo (and the subsequent Native

Title Act of 1993) is sufficient in providing justice for Australian aboriginals. My point is merely
that this arrangement is consistent with—indeed, based on—the notion that different forms of
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With this set of lessons in mind, it’s important to note that, much like property easements,
border-crossing easements are likely to take many different forms, and generate different sorts of
“differentiated citizenship” statuses, relevant to the circumstances that lead to the justified claim
for an easement. I initially formulated this concept as “migration easements,” but this suggests a
right to actual migration, which might attach in certain cases, but by no means all of them.22 In
some cases, a border-crossing easement may entail little more than an exception to
administrative checkpoints (for the Tohono O’odham, for example, or Torres Strait Islanders
traveling between Australia and Papua New Guinea). In other cases, border-crossing easements
may entail permission to cross borders for the purposes of seasonal work or temporary migration.
In some cases, border-crossing easements may entail political incorporation, with full citizenship
for citizens of the dominant tenement in the servient tenement. During the years of South
Africa’s apartheid regime, Lesothan incorporation into South Africa was unthinkable. Since
South Africa’s democratization, however, ethnic Basothans from the South African side of the
Free State border have played a significant role in Free State governance, and many nonelite
Lesothans, who regard their own domestic political elites and institutions as an oppressive,
extractive anachronism compared to South African democracy, regard political incorporation as
an attractive option (Coplan 2001, 110–13). A case could plausibly be made that political
property rights entail different bundles of privileges based on the alleged purpose of that form of
property rights. For compelling arguments that native title in Australia should be transformed
into something more akin to alienable freeholder title, see Levy (1994) and Altman (2012). For
an argument against such a plan, see Hepburn (2006).
22

I thank Robert Goodin for pointing this out.
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incorporation, with Lesotho as a tenth South African state, would be the best way to fulfill the
easement demands of Lesothan workers. The point I wish to make here is that there is not a
preferred or ideal administrative or legal form of border-crossing easement rights; like easements
in property law, they arise to address particular situations, and their form is determined by the
nature of the border-crossing practices and the obstacles they now face. Furthermore, this
argument is not meant to suggest that all border-crossing easements are absolute or permanent.
Just as property easements can be brought to an end by negotiated arrangements or changes in
use patterns, so too might border-crossing easements. And an easement might be trumped by
another, more urgent consideration; for example, a particular individual who has a bordercrossing easement right might be justly denied entry if he has demonstrated a pattern of violent
criminal behavior. The precise conditions that might justifiably override a migration easement
are beyond the scope of this chapter; I merely note here, drawing another parallel to conventional
property easements, that such an override is conceivable and consistent with a fairly strong
easement right.
If we are to accept the national community claim to territory as a form of property, we
need an understanding of justified exclusion to fit the purpose of this particular property right. I
have argued that border-crossing easements are analogous to easements in property law in
several important respects such that they provide sufficient justification for an exception to the
right to exclude outsiders. Miller’s account of the right to exclude as a territorial-ownership right
is not absolute; refugees and the truly desperate may have a justified right to demand an
exception to a policy of exclusion. This would suggest he might be amenable to border-crossing
easements by necessity, but not particularly welcoming to easements by prescription, since
necessity for self-sufficiency is not a condition for the latter. But just as easements by
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prescription are consistent with our general enjoyment of private property rights, border-crossing
easements by prescription, such as the cases considered here, can and should be understood as
consistent with the general purpose and function of territorial rights of national communities.
That purpose for Miller is to give a people the chance to build a way of life together,
intentionally and democratically. That is certainly one way to describe the set of practices over
the last century or more that created the claim to a border-crossing easement—if a national
community is the kind of agent that Miller wants it to be, it should be considered the kind of
agent capable of entering into practices and arrangements that create responsibilities and
obligations going forward, such as the creation of easements.
One curious feature of Miller’s argument is that when he describes the nature and value
of national communities, his account is deeply sensitive to their status as specific and concrete
historical entities, and to the claim that shared history has on those operating in the present. His
account of national communities is very much grounded in their actual historical character,
culture, and long-standing practices. But when he turns to considering the range of possible
approaches to the question of migration and exclusion, the weight and power of historical
practice has suddenly vanished. He does not mention how previous approaches to inclusion and
exclusion might play a role in determining the boundaries of just inclusion. Miller argues that
Mexican labor migrants have no special claim to gain admittance to the United States even if it is
their “favored destination” (2010, 118). But it is their favored destination not as a simple matter
of taste or even just as a matter of convenience. It is their “favored destination” due to a series of
decisions made by a variety of actors on both sides of the border during the last 165 years that
have shaped the cultures and economies that confront the individual and condition that
“preference.” Miller grants national communities a legitimate right to attempt to control and
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shape the development of a common culture through immigration policy. If we accept this we
surely must also accept that some previous efforts to do just this may create limits on what we
can do today, particularly in cases where our previous efforts have shaped not only our own
national community but also that of a neighboring country (and a substantially weaker and less
powerful one at that). The recognition of border-crossing easements by prescription would make
the general right to exclude less robust, but it would make it more consistent with the purpose of
exclusionary territorial rights for national communities. Indeed, it would better recognize
national communities as moral agents, by recognizing their historical capacity to incur specific
responsibilities via long-standing patterns of behavior and use. It would also entail recognition of
an important fact about such communities—that, like plots of private property within a nation,
they are not islands, and through ordinary historical practice may become entangled with each
other in ways that create moral/legal obligations and restrictions.
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